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Abstract
To meet the standard of differential privacy, noise
is usually added into the original data, which
inevitably deteriorates the predicting performance
of subsequent learning algorithms. In this paper,
motivated by the success of improving predicting
performance by ensemble learning, we propose
to enhance privacy-preserving logistic regression
by stacking. We show that this can be done ei-
ther by sample-based or feature-based partitioning.
However, we prove that when privacy-budgets are
the same, feature-based partitioning requires fewer
samples than sample-based one, and thus likely
has better empirical performance. As transfer
learning is difficult to be integrated with a differ-
ential privacy guarantee, we further combine the
proposed method with hypothesis transfer learning
to address the problem of learning across different
organizations. Finally, we not only demonstrate
the effectiveness of our method on two benchmark
data sets, i.e., MNIST and NEWS20, but also apply
it into a real application of cross-organizational
diabetes prediction from RUIJIN data set, where
privacy is of a significant concern. 1
1 Introduction
In recent years, data privacy has become a serious con-
cern in both academia and industry [Dwork et al., 2006;
Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Dwork and Roth, 2014; Abadi et
al., 2016]. There are now privacy laws, such as Europe’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which regulates
the protection of private data and restricts data transmission
between organizations. These raise challenges for cross-
organizational machine learning [Pathak et al., 2010; Hamm
et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017], in which
data have to be distributed to different organizations, and the
learning model needs to make predictions in private.
A number of approaches have been proposed to ensure
privacy protection. In machine learning, differential privacy
[Dwork and Roth, 2014] is often used to allow data be
exchanged among organizations. To design a differentially
1Correspondace to X. Guo at guoxiawei@4paradigm.com
private algorithm, carefully designed noise is usually added to
the original data to disambiguate the algorithms. Many stan-
dard learning algorithms have been extended for differential
privacy. These include logistic regression [Chaudhuri et al.,
2011], trees [Emekc¸i et al., 2007; Fong and Weber-Jahnke,
2012], and deep networks [Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015;
Abadi et al., 2016]. In particular, linear models are simple
and easy to understand, and their differentially private vari-
ants (such as privacy-preserving logistic regression (PLR))
[Chaudhuri et al., 2011]) have rigorous theoretical guarantees
[Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Bassily et al., 2014; Hamm et
al., 2016; Kasiviswanathan and Jin, 2016]. However, the
injection of noise often degrades prediction performance.
Ensemble learning can often signficantly improve the per-
formance of a single learning model [Zhou, 2012]. Pop-
ular examples include bagging [Breiman, 1996a], boosting
[Friedman et al., 2000], and stacking [Wolpert, 1992]. These
motivate us to develop an ensemble-based method which can
benefit from data protection, while enjoying good prediction
performance. Bagging and boosting are based on partitioning
of training samples, and use pre-defined rules (majority
or weighted voting) to combine predictions from models
trained on different partitions. Bagging improves learning
performance by reducing the variance. Boosting, on the other
hand, is useful in converting weak models to a strong one.
However, the logistic regression model, which is the focus in
this paper, often has good performance in many applications,
and is a relatively strong classifier. Besides, it is a convex
model and relatively stable.
Thus, in this paper, we focus on stacking. While stack-
ing also partitions the training data, this can be based on
either samples [Breiman, 1996b; Smyth and Wolpert, 1999;
Ozay and Vural, 2012] or features [Boyd et al., 2011].
Multiple low-level models are then learned on the different
data partitions, and a high-level model (typically, a logistic
regression model) is used to combine their predictions. By
combining with PLR, we show how differential privacy can
be ensured in stacking. Besides, when the importance of
features is known a priori, they can be easily incorporated
in feature-based partitioning. We further analyze the learning
guarantee of sample-based and feature-based stacking, and
show theoretically that feature-based partitioning can have
lower sample complexity (than sample-based partitioning),
and thus better performance. By adapting the feature impor-
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tance, its learning performance can be further boosted.
To demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method, we
perform experiments on two benchmark data sets (MNIST
and NEWS20). Empirical results confirm that feature-based
stacking performs better than sample-based stacking. It is
also better than directly using PLR on the training data set.
Besides, the prediction performance is further boosted when
feature importance is used. Finally, we apply the proposed
approach for cross-organizational diabetes prediction in the
transfer learning setting. The experiment is performed on the
RUIJIN data set, which contains over ten thousands diabetes
records from across China. Results show significantly im-
proved diabetes prediction performance over the state-of-the-
art, while still protecting data privacy.
Notation. In the sequel, vectors are denoted by lowercase
boldface, and (·)> denotes transpose of a vector/matrix;
σ(a) = exp(a)/(1+exp(a)) is the sigmoid function. A function
g is µ-strongly convex if g(αw+ (1−α)u) ≤ αg(w) + (1−
α)g(u)− µ2α(1− α)‖w − u‖2 for any α ∈ (0, 1).
2 Related Works
2.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork and Roth,
2014] has been established as a rigorous standard to guar-
antee privacy for algorithms that access private data. Intu-
itively, given a privacy budget , an algorithm preserves -
differentially privacy if changing one entry in the data set
does not change the likelihood of any of the algorithm’s
output by more than . Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 1 ([Dwork et al., 2006]). A randomized mech-
anism M is -differentially private if for all output t of
M and for all input data D1,D2 differing by one element,
Pr(M(D1) = t) ≤ e Pr(M(D2) = t).
To meet the -differentially privacy guarantee, careful
perturbation or noise usually needs to be added to the learning
algorithm. A smaller  provides stricter privacy guarantee but
at the expense of heavier noise, leading to larger performance
deterioration [Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Bassily et al., 2014].
A relaxed version of -differentially private, called (, δ)-
differentially privacy in which δ measures the loss in privacy,
is proposed [Dwork and Roth, 2014]. However, we focus on
the more stringent Definition 1 in this paper.
2.2 Privacy-preserving Logistic Regression (PLR)
Logistic regression has been popularly used in machine
learning [Friedman et al., 2012]. Various differential pri-
vacy approaches have been developed for logistic regression.
Examples include output perturbation [Dwork et al., 2006;
Chaudhuri et al., 2011], gradient perturbation [Abadi et al.,
2016] and objective perturbation [Chaudhuri et al., 2011;
Bassily et al., 2014]. In particular, objective perturbation,
which adds designed and random noise to the learning objec-
tive, has both privacy and learning guarantees as well as good
empirical performance.
Privacy-preserving logistic regression (PLR) [Chaudhuri et
al., 2011] is the state-of-the-art model based on objective
perturbation. Given a data set D = {xi, yi}ni=1, where
xi ∈ Rd is the sample and yi the corresponding class label,
we first consider the regularized risk minimization problem:
min
w
1/n
∑n
i=1
`(w>xi, yi) + λg(w), (1)
wherew is a vector of the model parameter, `(yˆ, y) = log(1+
e−yyˆ) is the logistic loss (with predicted label yˆ and given
label y), g is the regularizer and λ ≥ 0 is a hyperparameter.
To guarantee privacy, Chaudhuri et al. (2011) added two extra
terms to (1), leading to:
min
w
1/n
∑n
i=1
`(w>xi, yi)+b
>w/n+∆‖w‖2/2 + λg(w), (2)
where b is random noise drawn from h(b) ∝ exp(′/2‖b‖)
with E(‖b‖) = 2d/′, ′ is a privacy budget modified from
, and ∆ is a scalar depending on λ, n, . The whole PLR
procedure is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 PLR: Privacy-preserving logistic regression.
Require: privacy budget , data set D;
1: ′ = − log(1 + 1/2nλ + 1/16n2λ2);
2: if ′ > 0 then
3: ∆ = 0;
4: else
5: ∆ = (4n(exp(/4)− 1))−1 − λ and ′ = /2;
6: end if
7: scale ‖x‖ ≤ 1 for all x ∈ D;
8: pick a random vector b from h(b) ∝ exp (′‖b‖/2);
9: obtain w by solving (2);
10: return w.
Proposition 1 ([Chaudhuri et al., 2011]). If the regularizer
g is strongly convex, Algorithm 1 provides -differential
privacy.
While privacy guarantee is desirable, the resultant privacy-
preserving machine learning model may not have good learn-
ing performance. In practice, the performance typically
degrades dramatically because of the introduction of noise
[Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Rajkumar and Agarwal, 2012;
Bassily et al., 2014; Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015]. Assume
that samples from D are drawn i.i.d. from an underlying
distribution P . Let L(w;P ) = E(x,y)∼P [`(w>x, y)] be the
expected loss of the model. The following Proposition shows
the number of samples needed for PLR to have comparable
performance as a given baseline model. This bound is tight
for any -differential privacy algorithm, and cannot be further
improved [Kifer et al., 2012; Bassily et al., 2014]. However,
in contrast, the standard logistic regression model in (1) only
needs n > C1‖v‖2 log( 1δ )/2g samples [Shalev-Shwartz and
Srebro, 2008], and thus may be smaller.
Proposition 2 ([Chaudhuri et al., 2011]). Let g(·) = 1/2‖·‖2,
and v be a reference model parameter. Given δ > 0 and
g > 0, there exists a constant C1 such that when
n>C1 max
(‖v‖2 log( 1δ )/2g, d log( dδ )‖v‖/g, ‖v‖2/g) , (3)
w from Algorithm 1 meets Pr[L(w,P )≤L(v,P )+g]≥1−δ.
2.3 Multi-Party Data Learning
Ensemble learning has been considered with differential
privacy under multi-party data learning (MPL). The task is
to combine predictors from multiple parties with privacy
[Pathak et al., 2010]. Pathak et al. [2010] first proposed
a specially designed protocol to privately combine multiple
predictions. The performance is later surpassed by [Hamm
et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2017], which uses another
classifier built on auxiliary unlabeled data. However, all these
combination methods rely on extra, privacy-insensitive public
data, which may not be always available. Moreover, the
aggregated prediction may not be better than the best single
party’s prediction.
There are also MPL methods that do not use ensemble
learning. Rajkumar and Agarwal [2012] used stochastic
gradient descent, and Xie et al. [2017] proposed a multi-task
learning method. While these improve the performance of the
previous ones based on aggregation, they gradually lose the
privacy guarantee after more and more iterations.
3 Privacy-preserving Ensemble
In this section, we propose to improve the learning guarantee
of PLR by ensemble learning [Zhou, 2012]. Popular exam-
ples include bagging [Breiman, 1996a], boosting [Friedman
et al., 2000], and stacking [Wolpert, 1992]. Bagging and
boosting are based on partitioning of training samples, and
use pre-defined rules (majority or weighted voting) to com-
bine predictions from models trained on different partitions.
Bagging improves learning performance by reducing the
variance. However, logistic regression is a convex model
and relatively stable. Boosting, on the other hand, is useful
in combining weak models to a strong one, while logistic
regression is a relatively strong classifier and often has good
performance in many applications.
In this paper, we focus on stacking and show that its
privacy-preserving version can be realized based on sample
partitioning (Section 3.1) and feature partitioning (FP) (Sec-
tion 3.2). However, sample partitioning (SP) may suffer from
insufficient training samples, while FP does not. Besides,
FP allows the incorporation of feature importance to improve
learning performance.
3.1 Privacy-preserving Stacking with Sample
Partitioning (SP)
We first consider using stacking with SP, and PLR is used as
both the low-level and high-level models (Algorithm 2). As
stacking does not impose restriction on the usage of classifiers
on each partition of the training data, a simple combination of
stacking and PLR can be used to provide privacy guarantee.
Proposition 3. If the regularizer g is strongly convex, Algo-
rithm 2 provides -differential privacy.
However, while the high-level model can be better than
any of the single low-level models [Dzˇeroski and Zˇenko,
2004], Algorithm 2 may not perform better than directly
using PLR on the whole D for the following two reasons.
First, each low-level model uses only Sk (step 4), which is
about 1/K the size of D (assuming that the data set D is
partitioned uniformly). This smaller sample size may not
Algorithm 2 PST-S: Privacy-preserving stacking with SP.
Require: privacy budget , data set D;
1: partitionD into disjoint setsDl andDh, for training of the low-
level and high-level models, respectively;
2: partition samples in Dl to K disjoint sets {S1, . . . , SK};
3: for k = 1, . . . ,K do
4: train PLR (Algorithm 1) with privacy budget  on Sk, and
obtain the low-level model parameter wlk;
5: end for
6: construct meta-data setMs = {[σ(x>wl1);. . . ;σ(x>wlK)], y}
using all samples {x, y} ∈ Dh;
7: train PLR (Algorithm 1) with privacy budget  on Ms, and
obtain the high-level model parameter wh;
8: return {wlk} and wh.
satisfy condition (3) in Proposition 2. Second, in many real-
world applications, features are not of equal importance. For
example, for diabetes prediction using the RUIJIN data set
(Table 3), Glu120 and Glu0, which directly measure glucose
levels in the blood, are more relevant than features such as
age and number of children. However, during training of the
low-level models, Algorithm 2 adds equal amounts of noise
to all features. If we can add less noise to the more important
features while keeping the same privacy guarantee, we are
likely to get better learning performance.
3.2 Privacy-preserving Stacking with Feature
Partitioning (FP)
To address the above problems, we propose to partition the
data based on features instead of samples in training the low-
level models. The proposed feature-based stacking approach
is shown in Algorithm 3. Features are partitioned into K
subsets, and Dl is split correspondingly into K disjoint
sets {F1, . . . ,FK}. Obviously, as the number of training
samples is not reduced, the sample size condition for learning
performance guarantee is easier to be satisfied (details will be
established in Theorem 4).
When the relative importance of feature subsets is known,
Algorithm 3 adds less noise to the more important features.
Specifically, let the importance3 of Fk (with dk features) be
qk, where qk ≥ 0 and
∑
k=1 qk = 1, and is independent withD. Assume that ′ > 0 in step 6 (and thus k = ′). Recall
from Section 2.2 that E(‖bk‖) = 2dk/k = 2dk/′. By scaling
the samples in each Fk as in step 5, the injected noise level in
Fk is given by E(‖bk‖)/‖x‖ = 2dk/′qk. This is thus inversely
proportional to the importance qk.
Remark 1. In the special case where only one feature group
has nonzero importance, Algorithm 3 reduces Algorithm 1 on
that group, and privacy is still guaranteed.
Finally, a privacy-preserving low-level logistic regression
model is obtained in step 12, and a privacy-preserving high-
level logistic regression model is obtained in step 15. In
general, each low-level model can have its own regularizer
gk (an example is shown in Theorem 5).
1). Privacy Guarantee. Theorem 4 guarantees privacy of
Algorithm 3. Note that the proofs in [Chaudhuri et al., 2011;
3When feature importance is not known, q1 = · · · = qK = 1/K.
Algorithm 3 PST-F: Privacy-preserving stacking with FP.
Require: privacy budget , data setD, feature importance {qk}Kk=1
where qk ≥ 0 and
∑K
k=1 qk = 1;
2
1: partitionD into disjoint setsDl andDh, for training of the low-
level model and high-level model, respectively;
2: partitionDl toK disjoint sets {F1, . . . ,FK} based on features;
3: ′ = −∑Kk=1 log(1 + q2k/2nλk + q4k/16n2λ2k);
4: for k = 1, . . . ,K do
5: scale ‖x‖ ≤ qk for all x ∈ Fk;
6: if ′ > 0 then
7: ∆k = 0 and k = ′;
8: else
9: ∆k = q
2
k/4n(exp(qk/4)−1)− λk and k = /2;
10: end if
11: pick a random bk from h(b) ∝ exp(k‖b‖/2);
12: wlk = arg minw1/n
∑
xi∈Fk `(w
>xi, yi) + b
>
k w/n +
∆‖w‖2/2 + λkgk(w);
13: end for
14: construct meta-data setMf = {[σ(x>(1)wl1),. . . ,σ(x>(K)wlK)],
y} using all {x, y} ∈ Dh, where x(k) is a vector made from x
by taking features covered by Fk;
15: train PLR (Algorithm 1) with privacy budget  on Mf , and
obtain the high-level model parameter wh;
16: return {wlk} and wh.
Bassily et al., 2014] cannot be directly used, as they consider
neither stacking nor feature importance.
Theorem 4. If all gk’s are strongly convex, Algorithm 3
provides -differential privacy.
2). Learning Performance Guarantee. Analogous to
Proposition 1, the following bounds the learning performance
of each low-level model.
Theorem 5. gk = 1/2‖ · −uk‖2, where uk is any constant
vector, and vk is a reference model parameter. Let ak =
qk‖vk‖. given δ > 0 and g > 0, there exists a constant C1
such that when
n>C1 max
(
a2k log(1/δ)/2g, d log(
d/Kδ)ak/qkKg, a
2
k/g
)
, (4)
wlk from Algorithm 3 satisfies Pr[L(w
l
k, P ) ≤ L(vk, P ) +
g] ≥ 1− δ.
Remark 2. When K = 1 (a single low-level model trained
with all features) and uk = 0, Theorem 5 reduces to
Proposition 2.
Note that, to keep the same bound L(vk, P ) + g , since
xs’ are scaled by qk, vk should be scaled by 1/qk, so E(ak) =
E(qk‖vk‖) remains the same as qk changes. Thus, Theorem 5
shows that low-level models on more important features can
indeed learn better, if these features are assigned with larger
qk. Since stacking can have better performance than any
single model [Ting and Witten, 1999; Dzˇeroski and Zˇenko,
2004] and Theorem 5 can offer better learning guarantee than
Proposition 2, Algorithm 3 can have better performance than
Algorithm 1. Finally, compared with Proposition 1, gk in
theorem 5 is more flexible in allowing an extra uk. We will
show in Section 3.3 that this is useful for transfer learning.
Since the learning performance of stacking itself is still an
open issue [Ting and Witten, 1999], we leave the guarantee
for the whole Algorithm 3 as future work. A potential
problem with FP is that possible correlations among feature
subsets can no longer be utilized. However, as the high-
level model can combine information from various low-level
models, empirical results in Section 4.1 show that this is not
problematic unless K is very large.
3.3 Application to Transfer Learning
Transfer learning [Pan and Yang, 2010] is a powerful and
promising method to extract useful knowledge from a source
domain to a target domain. A popular transfer learning ap-
proach is hypothesis transfer learning (HTL) [Kuzborskij and
Orabona, 2013], which encourages the hypothesis learned in
the target domain to be similar with that in the source domain.
For application to (1), HTL adds an extra regularizer as:
min
w
∑
xi∈Dtgt
`(w>xi, yi)+λg(w)+η/2‖w−wsrc‖2. (5)
Here, η is a hyperparameter, Dtgt is the target domain data,
and wsrc is obtained from the source domain. Algorithm 4
shows how PST-F can be extended with HTL using privacy
budgets src and tgt for the source and target domains,
respectively. The same feature partitioning is used on both
the source and target data. PLR is trained on each source
domain data subset to obtain (wsrc)k (steps 2-4). This is then
transferred to the target domain using PST-F with gk(w) =
1
2‖w−(wsrc)k‖2 (step 5).
Algorithm 4 PST-H: Privacy-preserving stacking with HTL.
Require: source data setsDsrc, target data setDtgt, and correspond-
ing privacy budgets src and tgt, respectively.
(source domain processing)
1: partition Dsrc to K disjoint sets {F1, . . . ,FK} based on fea-
tures;
2: for k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: train PLR with privacy budget src on Fk and obtain (wsrc)k;
4: end for
(target domain processing)
5: obtain
{
(wtgt)
l
k
}
and whtgt from PST-F (Algorithm 3) by taking
gk(w)=1/2‖w−(wsrc)k‖2 and privacy budget tgt on Dtgt;
6: return {(wsrc)k} for source domain,
{
(wtgt)
l
k
}
and whtgt for
target domain.
The following provides privacy guarantees on both the
source and target domains.
Corollary 6. Algorithm 4 provides src- and tgt-differential
privacy guarantees for the source and target domains.
Recently, privacy-preserving HTL is also proposed in
[Wang et al., 2018]. However, it does not consider stacking
and ignores feature importance.
4 Experiments
Experiments are performed on a server with Intel Xeon E5
CPU and 250G memory. All codes are in Python.
4.1 Benchmark Datasets
Experiments are performed on two popular benchmark data
sets for evaluating privacy-preserving learning algorithms
[Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015; Papernot et al., 2017; Wang
et al., 2018]: MNIST [LeCun et al., 1998] and NEWS20
[Lang, 1995] (Table 1). The MNIST data set contains images
of handwritten digits. Here, we use the digits 0 and 8. We
randomly select 5000 samples. 60% of them are used for
training (with 1/3 of this used for validation), and the remain-
ing 20% for testing. The NEWS20 data set is a collection
of newsgroup documents. Documents belonging to the topic
“sci” are taken as positive samples, while those in the topic
“talk” are taken as negative. Finally, we use 4 PCA to reduce
the feature dimensionality to 100, as original dimensionality
for MINIST/NEWS20 is too high for differentially private
algorithms to handle as the noise will be extremely large.
MNIST NEWS20
#train #test #features #train #test #features
3000 2000 100 4321 643 100
Table 1: Summary of the MNIST and NEWS20 data sets.
The following algorithms are compared: (i) PLR, which
applies Algorithm 1 on the training data; (ii) PST-S: Algo-
rithm 2, based on SP; and (iii) PST-F: Algorithm 3, based
on FP. We use K = 5 and 50% of the data for Dl and the
remaining for Dh. Two PST-F variants are compared: PST-
F(U), with random FP and equal feature importance. And
PST-F(W), with partitioning based on the PCA feature scores;
and the importance of the kth group Fk is
qk =
∑
i:fi∈Fk vi/
∑
j:fj∈Dl vj, (6)
where vi is the variance of the ith feature fi. Gradient
perturbation is worse than objective perturbation in logistic
regression [Bassily et al., 2014], thus is not compared.
The area-under-the-ROC-curve (AUC) [Hanley and Mc-
Neil, 1983] on the testing set is used for performance eval-
uation. Hyper-parameters are tuned using the validation set.
To reduce statistical variations, the experiment is repeated 10
times, and the results averaged.
1). Varying Privacy Budget . Figure 1 shows the testing
AUC’s when the privacy budget  is varied. As can be
seen, the AUCs for all methods improve when the privacy
requirement is relaxed ( is large and less noise is added).
Moreover, PST-S can be inferior to PLR, due to insufficient
training samples caused by SP. Both PST-F(W) and PST-F(U)
have better AUCs than PST-S and PLR. In particular, PST-
F(W) is the best as it can utilize feature importance. Since
PST-S is inferior to PST-F(U), we only consider PST-F(U) in
the following experiments.
2). Varying Number of PartitionsK. In this experiment, we
fix  = 1, and vary K. As can be seen from Figure 2, when
K is very small, ensemble learning is not effective. When K
is too large, a lot of feature correlation information is lost and
the testing AUC also decreases.
3). Changing the Feature Importance. In the above exper-
iments, feature importance is defined based on the variance
from PCA. Here, we show how feature importance influences
prediction performance. In real-world applications, we may
4 Here we use PCA for ablation study. However, note that
the importance scores should be obtained from side information
independent from the data or from experts’ opinions (as in diabetes
example). Otherwise, -differential privacy will not be guaranteed.
(a) MNIST. (b) NEWS20.
Figure 1: Testing AUC vs . Here, “∞” corresponds to the non-
privacy-preserving version of the corresponding algorithms.
(a) MNIST. (b) NEWS20.
Figure 2: Testing AUC at different K’s.
not know the exact importance of features. Thus, we replace
variance vi by the ith power of α (αi), where α is a positive
constant, and use (6) for assigning weights. Note that when
α < 1, more importance features have larger weights; and
vice versa when α> 1. Note that PST-F(W) does not reduce
to PST-F(U) when α = 1, as more important features are still
grouped together.
Figure 3 shows the testing AUCs at different α’s. As can
be seen, with proper assigned weights (i.e., α < 1 and more
important features have larger qk’s), the testing AUC can get
higher. If less important features are more valued, the testing
AUC decreases and may not be better than PST-F(U), which
uses uniform weights. Moreover, we see that PST-F(W) is not
sensitive to the weights once they are properly assigned.
(a) MNIST. (b) NEWS20.
Figure 3: Testing AUC with different feature importance settings.
4). Choice of High-Level Model. In this section, we
compare different high-level models in combining predic-
tions from the low-level models. The following methods are
compared: (i) major voting (C-mv) from low-level models;
(ii) weighted major voting (C-wmv), which uses {qk} as the
weights; and (iii) by a high-level model in PST-F (denoted
“C-hl”). Figure 4 shows results on NEWS20 with  = 1.0.
As can be seen, C-0 in Figure 4(b) has the best performance
among all single low-level models, as it contains the most
important features. Besides, stacking (i.e., C-hl), is the best
way to combine predictions from C-{0-4}, which also offers
branch# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
PST-H(W) 0.747±0.032 0.736±0.032 0.740±0.040 0.714±0.040 0.766±0.039 0.707±0.017 0.721±0.0464 0.753±0.042
PST-H(U) 0.678±0.049 0.724±0.037 0.652±0.103 0.708±0.033 0.653±0.070 0.663±0.036 0.682±0.0336 0.692±0.044
PPHTL 0.602±0.085 0.608±0.078 0.528±0.062 0.563±0.067 0.577±0.075 0.601±0.031 0.580±0.0708 0.583±0.056
PLR(target) 0.548±0.088 0.620±0.055 0.636±0.046 0.579±0.075 0.533±0.058 0.613±0.035 0.561±0.0764 0.584±0.045
branch# 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
PST-H(W) 0.701±0.023 0.698±0.036 0.736±0.046 0.738±0.045 0.746±0.0520 0.661±0.094 0.697±0.023 0.604±0.012
PST-H(U) 0.635±0.026 0.644±0.050 0.635±0.054 0.645±0.061 0.718±0.0647 0.644±0.044 0.647±0.061 0.567±0.036
PPHTL 0.547±0.066 0.517±0.075 0.565±0.059 0.547±0.089 0.592±0.0806 0.615±0.071 0.558±0.065 0.524±0.027
PLR(target) 0.515±0.065 0.555±0.061 0.553±0.066 0.520±0.088 0.619±0.0701 0.563±0.026 0.558±0.060 0.517±0.053
Table 2: Testing AUC on all branches of RUIJIN data set. The best and comparable results according to pair-wise 95% significance test are
high-lighted. Testing AUC of PLR on main center is 0.668±0.026.
better performance than any single low-level models.
(a) PST-F(U). (b) PST-F(W).
Figure 4: Testing AUC of low-levels models and different com-
bining methods on NEWS20 ( = 1.0), where C-0 to C-4 are
performance of low-level models.
4.2 Diabetes Prediction
1). Background. Diabetes is a group of metabolic disorders
with high blood sugar levels over a prolonged period. From
2012 to 2015, approximately 1.5 to 5 million deaths each year
are resulted from diabetes. Thus, prevention and diagnosis
of diabetes are of great importance. The RUIJIN diabetes
data set is collected by the Shanghai Ruijin Hospital during
two investigations (in 2010 and 2013), conducted by the main
hospital in Shanghai and 16 branches across China. The first
investigation consists of questionnaires and laboratory tests
collecting demographics, life-styles, disease information, and
physical examination results. The second investigation in-
cludes diabetes diagnosis. Some collected features are shown
in Table 3. Table 4 shows a total of 105,763 participants
who appear in both two investigations. The smaller branches
may not have sufficient labeled medical records for good
prediction. Hence, it will be useful to borrow knowledge
learned by the main hospital. However, users’ privacy is a
major concern, and patients’ personal medical records in the
main hospital should not be leaked to the branches.
name importance explaination
mchild 0.010 number of children
weight 0.012 birth weight
bone 0.013 bone mass measurement
eggw 0.005 frequency of having eggs
Glu120 0.055 glucose level 2 hours after meals
Glu0 0.060 glucose level immediately after meals
age 0.018 age
bmi 0.043 body mass index
HDL 0.045 high-density lipoprotein
Table 3: Some features in the RUIJIN data set, and importance is
suggested by doctors. Top (resp. bottom) part: Features collected
from the first (resp. second) investigation.
main #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8
12,702 4,334 4,739 6,121 2,327 5,619 6,360 4,966 5,793
#9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16
6,215 3,659 5,579 2,316 4,285 6,017 6,482 4,493
Table 4: Number of samples collected from the main hospital and
16 branches in the RUIJIN data set.
Setup. In this section, we apply the method in Section 3.3 for
diabetes prediction. Specifically, based on the patient data
collected during the first investigation in 2010, we predict
whether he/she will have diabetes diagnosed in 2013. The
main hospital serves as the source domain, and the branches
are the target domains. We set src = tgt = 1.0. The
following methods are also compared: (i) PLR(target), which
directly uses PLR on the target data; (ii) PPHTL [Wang et al.,
2018]: a recently proposed privacy-preserving HTL method
based on PLR; (iii) PST-F(U): There are 50 features, and they
are randomly split into five groups, i.e., K = 5, and each
group have equal weights; (iv) PST-F(W): Features are first
sorted by importance, and then grouped as follows: The top
10 features are placed in the first group, the next 10 features
go to the second group, and so on. qk is set based on (6), with
vi being the importance values provided by the doctors. The
other settings are the same as in Section 4.1.
2). Results. Results are shown in Table 2. PPHTL may not
have better performance than PLR(target), which is perhaps
due to noise introduced in features. However, PST-F(U)
improves over PPHTL by feature splitting, and consistently
outperforms PLR(target). PST-F(W), which considers fea-
tures importance, is the best.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning method, which improves privacy-preserving
logistic regression by stacking. This can be done by either
sample-based or feature-based partitioning of the data set.
We provide theoretical justifications that the feature-based
approach is better and requires a smaller sample complexity.
Besides, when the importance of features is available, this
can further boost the feature-based approach both in theory
and practice. Effectiveness of the proposed method is verified
on both standard benchmark data sets and a real-world cross-
organizational diabetes prediction application. As a future
work, we will extend the proposed algorithm to other classi-
fiers, such as decision tree and deep networks.
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A Proof
Notation. Given two datasets D and D′, |D − D′| = 1
denotes that D and D′ differ only 1 sample. Let J(w →
b|D) denote the Jacobian matrix of the mapping from w
to b, when the dataset is D. Let F¯ (w;D,b,∆) denote∑
{xi,yi}∈D `(w
>xi, yi) + 1nb
>w + 12∆‖w‖2, where n is
the number of samples in D.
A.1 Proposition 3
Proof. Note that we apply PLR algorithm with privacy bud-
get  on Sk, so wlk is -differentially private for Sk. We apply
PLR algorithm on meta-dataMs. So we have
Pr(wh|Dh)
Pr(wh|D′h) =
Pr(wh|Ms)
Pr(wh|Ms) = .
Since {S1,S2, . . . ,SK ,Dh} are disjoint subsets, according to
Theorem 4 in [McSherry and Mironov, 2009], {{wlk},wh} is
-differentially private.
A.2 Theorem 4
To prove Theorem 4, we first prove the following Lemma 7
and 8. Without of generality, we assume g is of 1-strongly
convex in the sequel.
Lemma 7. For a dataset D and a vector b, assume that ` is
differentiable and continuous with |`′(z)| ≤ 1, and |`′′(z)| ≤
c for all z, and g is 1-strongly convex, ‖xi‖ ≤ q for all xi ∈
D. Let D and D′ be the two datasets which differ in the value
of the n-th item such that
D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn−1, yn−1), (xn, yn)}, (7)
D′ = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn−1, yn−1), (x′n, y′n)}, (8)
Moreover, let b and b′ be two vectors such that
w¯ = arg min
w
F¯ (w;D,b,∆) + λg(w)
= arg min
w
F¯ (w;D′,b′,∆) + λg(w)
For any ∆ ≥ 0, we have
|det(J(w¯→ b′|D′))|
|det(J(w¯→ b|D))| ≤
(
1 +
q2c
n(λ+ ∆)
)2
, (9)
and
‖b‖ − ‖b′‖ ≤ 2q. (10)
Proof. We take the gradient of F to 0 at w¯, and can obtain
b = −nλ∆g(w¯)−
n∑
i
yi`
′(yix>i w¯)x− n∆w¯
Moreover, define matrices A and E as follows:
A = nλ∇2g(w¯) +
n∑
i=1
y2i `
′′(yix>i w¯)xix
>
i + n∆Id, (11)
E = −y2i `′′(yix>i w¯)xix>i + (y′n)2`′′(y′nx′>i w¯)x′nx′>n
(12)
From the proof of Theorem 9 in [Chaudhuri et al., 2011] we
know
|det(J(w¯→ b′|D′))|
|det(J(w¯→ b|D))|
= |1 + τ1(A−1E) + τ2(A−1E) + τ1(A−1E)τ2(A−1E)|,
where τ1(), τ2() denote the largest and second largest eigen-
values of a matrix. Applying the triangle inequality of trace
norm,
|τ1(E)|+ |τ2(E)| ≤|y2n`′′(ynx>n w¯)|‖xn‖2
+ | − (y′n)2`′′(ynx′>n w¯)|‖x′n‖2
Then upper bounds on |yi|, ‖xi‖, and |`′′(z)| yield
|τ1(E)|+ |τ2(E)| ≤ 2cq2.
Therefore |τ1(E)| · |τ2(E)| ≤ c2q4, and
|det(J(w¯→ b′|D′))|
|det(J(w¯→ b|D))|
≤ 1 + 2cq
2
n(λ+ ∆)
+
c2q4
n2(λ+ ∆)2
=
(
1 +
cq2
n(λ+ ∆)
)2
and we obtain (9). For b and b′, we have
b′ − b = yn`′(ynx>n w¯)xn − y′n`′(ynx′>n w¯)x′n
Due to that of |`′(·)| ≤ 1,|yi| ≤ 1, ‖xi‖ ≤ q, we have
‖b‖ − ‖b‖′ ≤ ‖b− b′‖ ≤ 2q,
and we obtain (10).
Lemma 8. {wlk} in Algorithm 3 is -differentially private
with dataset Dl.
Proof. For simplicity, in this proof we ignore the superscript
·l. The proof follows the proof of Theorem 9 in [Chaudhuri
et al., 2011]. Let D and D′ be two datasets of size n and
|D − D′| = 1. So |Fk − F ′k| = 1 for all k. We have a set of
optimization problems
wk = arg min
w
F¯ (w;Fk,bk,∆k) + λkgk(w),∀k.
Since w1,w2, . . . ,wK are independent given the dataset, we
have
Pr({wk}Kk=1|D)
Pr({w(k)}Kk=1|D′)
=
K∏
k=1
Pr(wk|Fk)
Pr(wk|F ′k)
=
K∏
k=1
Pr(bk|F)
Pr(b′k|F ′k)
∣∣det(Jk(w(k) → bk|Fk))∣∣−1∣∣det(Jk(wk → b′k|F ′k))∣∣−1 .
By (9) in Lemma 7 with upper bound of sample norm q(k),
|det(Jk(wk → bk|Fk))|−1∣∣det(Jk(w(k) → b′k|F ′k))∣∣−1 ≤
(
1 +
c(qk)
2
n(λk + ∆k)
)2
,
and
Pr(bk|D)
Pr(b′k|D′)
≤ e′(‖bk‖−‖b′k‖)/2 ≤ eqk′ .
Thus
Pr({wk}Kk=1|D)
Pr({wk}Kk=1|D′)
= e
′
K∏
k=1
(
1 +
c(qk)
2
n(λk + ∆k)
)2
.
We know that for `(·), c = 14 . When ∆ = 0,  = ′ +∑
k=1 log(1 +
(qk)
2
2nλk
+ (qk)
4
16n2(λk)2
), we have
Pr({wk}Kk=1|D)
Pr({wk}Kk=1|D′)
= e.
When ∆ > 0, by definition,
K∏
k=1
(
1 +
c(qk)
2
n(λk + ∆k)
)2
=
K∏
k=1
eqk/2 = e/2,
 = ′ + /2.
As a result,
Pr({wk}Kk=1|D)
Pr({wk}Kk=1|D′)
= e.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof. From Lemma 8, we know that {wkl } is -differentially
private for Dl. Since we apply PLR onMf , we have
Pr(wh|Dh)
Pr(wh|D′h) =
Pr(wh|Mf )
Pr(wh|M′f ) = .
So wh is -differentially private for Dh. Since Dl and Dh
are disjoint subsets, according to Theorem 4 in [McSherry
and Mironov, 2009], {{wlk},wh} is -differentially private
for D.
A.3 Theorem 5
Proof. For simplicity, we omit the superscript ·l. Suppose the
samples in F are i.i.d. drawn according to Pk. We define
Fk(w,D) = 1
n
∑
(xi,yi)∈Fk
`(w>xi, yi) + λkgk(w), (13)
F˜k(w) = L(w, Pk) +
λk
2
‖w‖2. (14)
and let
w˜k = arg min
w
F˜k(w) (15)
(wk)
∗ = arg min
w
Fk(w,D). (16)
The results in proof of Theorem 18 in [Chaudhuri et al., 2011]
shows
L(wk) =L(vk) + (F˜k(wk)− F˜k(w˜k)) (17)
+ (F˜k(w˜k)− F˜k(vk)) + λk
2
‖vk‖2 − λk
2
‖wk‖2.
Let sk = ‖vk‖ If n > qk(sk)
2
g
and λk >
g
(sk)2
, then nλk >
qk
 , from the definition of 
′ in Algorithm 3,
′ = − 2
K∏
k=1
log(1 +
(qk)
2
4nλk
)
= − 2
K∏
k=1
log(1 +
qk
4
) ≥ − 
2
,
where the last step is from the inequality log(1 + x) < x for
x ∈ [0, 1].
From the Lemma 19 in [Chaudhuri et al., 2011], we have
that with probability at least 1− δ,
Fk(wk,D)− Fk((wk)∗,D) ≤ 4d
2 log2(d/(Kδ))(qk)
2
λkn22
.
From [Sridharan et al., 2009],
F˜k(wk)− F˜k(w˜k)
≤ 2(Fk(wk,D)− Fk((wk)∗,D)) +O( log(1/δ)
K2λkn
)
≤ 8d
2 log2(d/(Kδ))
K2λkn22
+O( (qk)
2 log(1/δ)
λkn
).
By definition of w˜k, we have F˜ (w˜k)− F˜ (vk) ≤ 0. If λk =
g
(sk)2
, then the 4th term in (17) is at most g2 . Finally, the
Theorem follows by solving for n to make the total excess
error at most g .
